Remittances, usually understood as the money or goods that migrants send back to families and friends in origin countries, are often the most direct and well-known link between migration and development. Remittances exceed official development aid but are private funds. Global estimates of financial transfers by migrants include transactions beyond what are commonly assumed to be remittances, as the statistical definition used for the collection of data on remittances is broader (see IMF, 2009. Also, such estimates do not cover informal transfers. Remittances can also be of a social nature, such as the ideas, behaviour, identities, social capital and knowledge that migrants acquire during their residence in another part of the country or abroad, that can be transferred to communities of origin (Levitt, 1998: 927).
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See our thematic page on COVID-19 and migration data for more data on the impact of COVID-19 on remittances.
Remittance flows in 2020 to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are projected to fall by 7.2 per cent to USD 508 billion, followed by a further decline of 7.5 per cent to USD 470 billion in 2021. These projected declines are among the sharpest in recent history (World Bank, 2020a). According to the World Bank, this fall is largely due to the economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic; for migrant workers, the pandemic has meant a fall in wages and employment (ibid.).
The World Bank projects a decline of remittance flows in 2020 across all regions: Europe and Central Asia (-16%); Sub-Saharan Africa (-8.8%), South Asia (-4%), the Middle East and North Africa (-8%), Latin America and the Caribbean (-0.2%), and East Asia and the Pacific (-10.5%) (ibid.).
This decline comes after remittances to LMICs reached a record USD 554 billion in 2019, overtaking Foreign Direct Investments (World Bank, 2020b). In 2019, in current USD, the top five remittance recipient countries were India (83.1 billion), China (68.4 billion), Mexico (38.5 billion), the Philippines (35.2 billion), and the Arab Republic of Egypt (26.8 billion) (ibid.). In relative terms, the top 5 countries which received the highest remittances as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 were: Tonga (37.6% of GDP), Haiti (37.1%), South Sudan (34.1%), the Kyrgyz Republic (29.2%), and Tajikistan (28.2%) (ibid.).
In the third quarter of 2020, the average costs of sending USD 200 to LMICs remained high at 6.8 per cent, well above the target of 3 per cent of the Sustainable Development Goal 10.c.1 (World Bank, 2020a). Sub-Saharan Africa continued to have the highest average remittance costs, at about 8.5 per cent; South Asia had the lowest average remittance costs at 5 per cent. The average remittance costs for the remaining regions were: Europe and Central Asia (6.5%); East Asia and Pacific (7.1%); Middle East and North Africa (7.5%); and Latin America and the Caribbean (5.8%) (ibid.).
Despite these projections, some countries stood out as exceptions , escaping a decline in remittance inflows in the second quarter of 2020 and forecasting an increase for the third quarter (ibid.). In Mexico, for instance, remittances were 1.5 times higher in March – the month the pandemic was officially declared – than in the previous month (Banco de México, 2020) and in July they rose once more to their third highest level on record, up by nearly 7 per cent (ibid.). Economists attribute this financial behaviour (or “sale effect”, according to Sirkeci, Cohen and Ratha, 2012) largely to the exchange rate fluctuations and to migrants’ fear that their incomes would be reduced in destination countries, prompting them to send savings to their families in countries affected by the Covid-19 outbreak (IOM, 2020). Also in Latin American, a similar trend has been observed with remittances to the Dominican Republic, which received up to 0.5 per cent more remittances in the first six months of 2020 than in the same period in 2019 (Pew Research Center, 2020).
In South Asia, and also defying negative forecasts, remittance inflows to Pakistan and Bangladesh increased sharply in July 2020, with the latter registering a 53.5 per cent year-on-year increase in the third quarter. Economists affirm that this spike in remittances could be partially attributed to the “Haj effect”, which refers to Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants sending home the money they would have used for pilgrimage to Mecca, had it not been for the steep reduction in visas issued due to the pandemic (World Bank, 2020a).
It must be stressed, nonetheless, that variables other than reduction of income and currency fluctuation must be factored in when analysing changes in remittance flows prompted by crises like the COVID-19 outbreak, namely: health vulnerability, economic recession, lack of access to crisis-response systems (IOM, 2020), development and growth trends in both sending and destination countries, migrants’ attitudes toward consumption, cultural characteristics and migration experiences (Sirkeci, Cohen and Ratha, 2012).
Remittances are usually understood as financial or in-kind transfers made by migrants to friends and relatives back in communities of origin. However, the statistical definition of international remittances only partially reflects this common understanding.
The International Monetary Fund, the main provider of international remittances statistics based on Central Bank data, defines remittances as the sum of two main components in their Balance of Payments Statistics manual:
(1) “Compensation of employees”: This refers to income earned by temporary migrant workers in the host country, and the income of workers who are employed by embassies, international organizations and foreign companies (or “the income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are employed in an economy where they are not resident and of residents employed by nonresident entities” (IMF, 2009: 272). It is important to highlight that the entire income of temporary migrant workers is included in this definition, although the income may never actually be transferred (at least not entirely) to the origin country as migrants still have to cover their own living costs. Furthermore, the salaries of staff employed by foreign employers (such as embassies or transnational companies) also count as remittances, as these civil servants, diplomats, military personnel and others are considered residents of the origin country (IMF, 2009), although most of these employees may actually not be migrants nor transfer this money anywhere else.
(2) “Personal transfers”: These are all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by residents (be it migrants or non-migrants) from or to individuals in other countries (“all current transfers between resident and non-resident individuals” (IMF, 2009: 273).
Remittances can also be sent within countries and not just across borders. These are called internal remittances. Furthermore, not all remittances are of financial or in-kind nature. Social remittances are defined as “the ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities” (Levitt, 1998: 927). Social remittances include innovative ideas, valuable transnational networks, knowledge, political values, policy reforms and new technological skills.Back to top
The World Bank provides annual estimates of remittances flows globally (and bilaterally), based on national balance of payment statistics produced by central Banks and compiled by the IMF. (See definitions of the two main remittances components above that give examples of what is included and what is not [Plaza and Ratha, 2017: 65-78]). Data cover remittances inflows into and outflows from countries. The latter are less prominent in the migration and development debates but can be an indication of significant immigrant populations in a country, especially if they exceed remittances inflows.
The basis for bilateral remittances estimates are weighted migrant stock data, the weighted income of migrants based on the per capita income in the country of destination, and the weighted income in the origin country of the migrant (Ratha and Shaw, 2007: 43).
The World Bank also produces estimates of remittances’ transaction costs on a quarterly basis. These are “average transaction costs of sending remittances to a specific country” and are computed as “the simple average of the total transaction cost in percentage for sending USD 200, charged by each single remittance service provider (RSP) included in the Remittance Prices Worldwide (RPW) database to a specific country”. World Bank researchers derive these estimates through either undertaking actual transactions themselves to obtain prices, or by inquiring on the transfer costs to a number of banks and money transfer operators (Alvarez et al., 2015: 45).
Since 2007, the Financing Facility for Remittances (FFR) of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) has published data and statistics on remittances through its series of Sending Money Home reports based on information from Central Banks, the IMF, and the World Bank RPW database, among others. The reports cover central issues affecting remittances from both a global and regional perspective and provide comparative indicators to measure the importance of remittances among regions and subregions. The latest report (2017) includes data and analysis of remittances and migration trends for developing countries over the past decade as well as the potential contributions of remittances to the Sustainable Development Goals.
In 2018, IFAD’s FFR launched RemitSCOPE, an online tool providing regional, subregional and country-level data and remittance market analyses. It aims to address the fast-changing market realities in the remittance industry in order to help bring together the goals of remittance families, as clients, and the strategies of the private-sector service providers. RemitSCOPE provides market profiles for 50 countries or areas in the Asia and the Pacific region but additional regions of the world will be included gradually.Back to top
Data strengths & limitations
The World Bank estimates are used to provide a large dataset covering most countries around the world. This allows the user to understand trends and the magnitude of transfers, comparing them to other flows such as Official Development Assistance (ODA). However, the estimates are far from accurate, due to the methodological challenges outlined below (Alvarez et al., 2015; World Bank, 2016; Plaza and Ratha, 2017).
The balance of payments category of “compensation of employees”, as defined by the IMF, can potentially significantly overestimate migrant remittances if a country has a large UN and/or embassy presence, and hosts factories of transnational corporations employing large numbers of workers. These employees are counted as “non-residents” or migrants in the country, and all their salaries are recorded as remittances. It is thus not possible to ascertain whether the official IMF and World Bank figures are accurate for these countries or considerable overestimates due to embassy, UN and foreign companies’ staff salaries being counted as well (Alvarez et al., 2015).
Statistically, migrants who reside in a country for at least 12 months cannot be distinguished from other residents who are not migrants as these statistics are based on residence and not migratory status (Alvarez et al., 2015: 43). In the second component of remittances – “personal transfers” – the IMF considers if a transfer is made across borders, regardless of the residency status, nationality or country of birth of a person, as this information is often not available. The receiver or sender of the money transfer may thus not only be a migrant but also a citizen with links to another country, for instance. Thus, remittances can be conflated with larger sums of money sent by private investors and diaspora members for business investments, property purchase and other financial transactions. This leads to the probable overestimation of transfers.
When comparing remittances estimates over time, it is important to note that the documented growth in remittances globally in recent years may have actually derived from changes in how remittances are measured, rather than actual increases in such financial flows (Ratha, 2003; World Bank, 2006; Clemens and McKenzie, 2014). Almost 80 per cent of the increase in recorded remittances during the period 1990—2010 may be accounted for by changes in measurement, and only a fifth may reflect changes due to higher numbers of international migrants and the incomes they are likely to be earning in destination countries. In addition, both reporting of remittance transactions has been improved and migrants have increasingly used more formal payment methods as informal channels decreased as part of anti-money laundering measures (Ibid.).
It is also important to keep in mind that IMF and World Bank estimates focus on remittances transferred through official channels, such as banks. Not all small transactions by migrants conducted via money transfer operators (such as Western Union), post offices, mobile transfer companies (like M-Pesa in Kenya) are included in all the countries, neither are informal transfers (such as via friends, relatives or transport companies returning to the origin community), depending on the sources of data used by different central banks. As these transfers that are not systematically included in balance of payments can be significant in volume, in particular in the context of South-South corridors, the official figures are likely to underreport the phenomenon by as much as 50 per cent (Irving et al., 2010; World Bank, 2011). Due to the largely unknown scope of informal transfers, some countries, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa, do not report remittances figures to the IMF in their balance of payments. Data on remittances also vary from country to country due to differences in the availability of data, national legislative and policy frameworks, using citizenship instead of residency status in the definition, and for the simplification of processing the data (Irving et al., 2010; World Bank, 2011; Plaza and Ratha, 2017).
The extent of the over and underestimates are, however, unknown and difficult to calculate (IOM, 2018). Specific, representative migration and remittances surveys can provide more detailed, and reliable information at the national or local level (World Bank, 2011). This also includes commodity transfers, such as consumer items, that are not part of the official recordings but that can be significant, especially in South-South contexts (Melde and Schicklinski, 2011).
Bilateral remittance estimates are prone to the limitations of data on migrant stocks described here. The calculation is based on the gross national income (GNI) per capita in the origin country of the migrant and thus cannot account for GNI being higher there as the assumption is that migrants move to countries with higher incomes. The World Bank further acknowledges issues around not being able to attribute a transfer to a specific country, especially when passed through an international bank (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). It is thus important to underline that these are calculated estimates and do not represent accurate figures (Alvarez et al., 2015).
The testing of remittance channels through fictitious transfers of money by World Bank analysts entails significant limitations as well. Only a few corridors are monitored. Differences in transaction costs based on the amount sent, with the higher amounts likely to cost less to send, distorts the representativeness of relevant data. Costs may also change quickly, meaning the reported transaction costs rapidly become outdated (Alvarez et al., 2015). Nonetheless, estimates of transaction costs can help to monitor progress towards the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target of reducing sending costs to 3 per cent of the amount remitted.
|International Monetary Fund (IMF)|
|2009||Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, 6th edition (BPM6), IMF, Washington, D.C.|
|2009||International Transactions in Remittances: Guide for Compilers and Users, IMF, Washington, D.C.|
|Alvarez, P.S. et al.|
|2015||‘Remittances: How reliable are the data?’, Migration Policy Practice V(2): 42-46.|
|Plaza, S. and D. Ratha|
|2017||‘Remittances’, in Global Migration Group (eds.) Handbook for Improving the Production and Use of Migration Data for Development. Global Knowledge Partnership for Migration and Development (KNOMAD), World Bank, Washington, D.C.: 65-78.|
|2020a||Migration and Development Brief 33: COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens, October|
|2020b||Migration and Development Brief 32: COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens,|
|2019||Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments and Outlook. Migration and Development Brief, No. 31|
|2019||Data release: Remittances to low- and middle-income countries on track to reach $551 billion in 2019 and $597 billion by 2021. People on the Move blog.|
|2019||Leveraging Economic Migration for Development : A Briefing for the World Bank Board (English). Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group.|
|2018a||Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments and Outlook. Migration and Development Brief, No. 30, December 2018. World Bank, Washington, DC.|
|2018b||Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments and Outlook. Migration and Development Brief, No. 29, April 2018. World Bank, Washington, DC.|
|2016||Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016. World Bank, Washington, D.C.|
|2011||‘Data Notes’, The Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, Migration and Remittances Unit, World Bank, Washington, D.C.|
|2006||Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration. Washington, DC.|
|Irving, J., S. Mohapatra and D. Ratha|
|2010||‘Migrant Remittance Flows. Findings from a Global Survey of Central Banks’, World Bank Working Paper No. 194, World Bank, Washington, D.C.|
|Clemens, M. A. and D. McKenzie|
Why Don’t Remittances Appear to Affect Growth? CGD Working Paper 366, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC.
“Leveraging Remittances for Development.” Policy Brief, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC.
|2003||“Workers Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance.” Global Development Finance, World Bank, Washington DC.|
|Ratha, D. et al|
“Workers Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance.” Global Development Finance, World Bank, Washington DC
|International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)|
|2017||Sending Money Home: Contributing to the SDGS, one family at a time.|
|2015||Sending Money Home: European flows and markets.|
|2013||Sending Money Home to Asia: Trends and opportunities in the world's largest remittance marketplace.|
‘Using longitudinal data to study migration and remittances’, in: Vargas-Silva, C. (ed.) Handbook of Research Methods in Migration. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: 186-206.
Melde, S. and J. Schicklinski
‘Social Remittances: Migration Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Diffusion’, International Migration Review, Vol. 32(4): 926-948.