Migration data relevant for the COVID-19 pandemic

Key migration trends

By theme

Labour migration 

164 million people were estimated to be migrant workers in 2017 (ILO, 2018). Migrant workers accounted for 20.6 per cent and 17.8 per cent of all workers in Northern America, and in Northern, Southern and Western Europe respectively (ibid.). They therefore represent about one in five workers in those regions and may be among the first to be affected by lay-offs and movement restrictions and lockdowns impacting livelihoods such as losing their businesses. Living conditions in crowded housing pose a particular risk to the spread of COVID-19 among migrant workers.

Migrants, regardless of where they work, make important contributions to address the pandemic but are also exposed to higher risks of contracting the virus. As an illustration, among the 20 countries with the highest number of  COVID-19  cases as of 3 November 2020, available international data show that at least 8 countries – the United States, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Chile and Belgium – depend on foreign-born workers in the critical sector of healthcare services (OECD, 2019). On the higher end, 33 per cent of doctors and 22 per cent of nurses in the United Kingdom in 2015/6 were foreign-born. (ibid.).

At the same time, a shortage of health care workers has been present at the global level for many years, and the demand for skilled health personnel is likely exacerbated by the current pandemic. In particular, origin countries of skilled migrants are faced with shortages in the health sector, which is however not only attributable to the emigration of workers. In Chile, 23 per cent of doctors were foreign-trained (OECD, 2020). In both the United States and United Kingdom, the majority of foreign-trained doctors in 2016 were educated in India and Pakistan. Additionally, many foreign-trained doctors in the United States studied in the Caribbean Islands, the Philippines, Mexico and Canada while many practicing in the United Kingdom studied in Nigeria, Egypt, Ireland, Greece and South Africa (OECD, 2019).

Migrants constitute a significant share among sectors that are critical as well as sectors that are most affected by the crisis: For example, more than 13 per cent of all services and sales workers in 7 of the 20 countries with the highest number of COVID-19 cases were foreign-born. Additionally, available data show that more than 9 per cent of all skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers in 5 of these countries were foreign-born (GMDAC analysis based on OECD DIOC, 2015/16). On average, 13 per cent of all key workers in the European Union (EU) are immigrants  (Fasani and Mazza, 2020). In 2017, the United States had recruited 161,583 foreign workers on seasonal work permits (OECD, 2019) and seasonal workers in countries in the EU are often undercounted. An estimated 69 per cent of all migrants in the United States work in critical infrastructure sectors (Center for Migration Studies, 2020 based on 2018 US Census Bureau data). In most of the OECD countries highly affected by the crisis, women make up between six and eight out of ten of the foreign-born workers in the sales and service sectors (GMDAC analysis based on OECD DIOC, 2015/16). The lockdowns in many countries can have disproportionate implications on the socio-economic status of migrant women, who are overrepresented in these sectors among all migrant workers.

^{Source: GMDAC analysis based on OECD DIOC, 2015/16}

^a _{Occupational data for the US are coded with US SOC codes and therefore are not directly comparable with data for the other countries in the above table which are coded with ISCO-08 codes.}

^b _{Since data are disaggregated by foreign-born, native-born and unknown, the percentages reflected here might be underestimates.}

^c _{Data for Belgium are not disaggregated by sex}

There were an estimated 11.5 million migrant domestic workers (MDWs) around the world in 2013, approximately 8.5 million of whom were female (ILO, 2015). In times of COVID 19, their employers may be infected and pass the disease on, perish with the worker losing their income since work permits are often tied to the employer. With border closures and economic constraints, returning to countries of origin is often not possible, trapping migrant domestic workers in destination countries without housing and income.

Among OECD countries, the share of immigrant workers living in poverty – despite being employed – was highest in Southern European countries and the United States in 2017/18. The in-work poverty rates in Spain and the United States in 2018 were 32.1 and 24.8 per cent respectively and it was 29.1 per cent in Italy in 2017 (OECD, 2019b). Such migrants can be disproportionately affected during the COVID-19 crisis when unemployment rates of citizens are also increasing but measures to mitigate the effects do not include migrants.

Low-skilled labour migrants in crowded dormitories have been disproportionately affected by the pandemic. Examples from Saudi Arabia and Singapore, where the Ministries of Health have provided official data on the migration status of individuals who tested positive, show the differential exposure to the virus of the migrant population. According to the Saudi Ministry of Health, 75 per cent of all new confirmed cases as of 7 May 2020 were among migrants. Over 95 per cent of the confirmed cases in Singapore by 19 June 2020 were migrants, with over 93 per cent of the total cases being related to migrants’ dormitories (Singapore Ministry of Health, 2020). Despite a downward trend in the number of new cases, as of 4 November 2020, residents of dormitories continued to account for nearly 94 per cent of the cumulative number of cases in Singapore (ibid.).

Remittances

An estimated 37 per cent of all remittance inflows globally in 2019 were received in the 20 countries with the highest number of confirmed COVID-19 cases as of 3 November 2020 (GMDAC analysis based on World Bank, 2020).  Globally, 7 of the 20 countries with the highest number of COVID-19 cases – the United States of America, India, the Russian Federation, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany – were among the 20 countries from which the highest amounts of remittances were sent in 2018. Remittances sent from these seven countries alone made up more than 23 per cent of all global remittances received in 2018 (ibid.). Remittances sent from the United States, countries in the Eurozone, the United Kingdom and Canada together accounted for an estimated 46 per cent of remittances received in low- and middle-income countries in 2019 (World Bank, 2019). 

Oil-producing countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are an important destination for migrants from South Asia and East Africa. As many international migrant workers in the GCC states returned to their origin countries (see section on return migration below) or can no longer travel to work due to lockdowns, sending remittances to their families is no longer possible. Since one in nine people around the world depend on remittances sent by migrant workers, COVID-19 will impact migrant families and communities in terms of remittance-supported nutrition, health, education and income, which in turn may lead to potential setbacks on progress made on several of the UN SDGs. It should however be noted that remittances are private funds and cannot replace Official Development Assistance and other public spending.

Before the COVID-19 crisis started, the World Bank (2019) had projected that 574 billion USD will be sent to low- and middle-income countries by the end of 2020, but job losses and difficulty to send remittances during shutdowns will significantly affect recipients dependent on these remittances for their financial stability. In April 2020, Ratha et al.  (2020a) estimated that remittances to low- and middle- income countries will fall to 445 billion USD in 2020, a decline of 20 per cent compared to 2019. In October 2020, Ratha et al. (2020b) adjusted their forecasted decline to low- and middle-income countries to 508 billion USD in 2020 and a further decline to 470 billion USD in 2021. 

Recent data from countries that are major recipients of remittances suggest a more nuanced trend. After an initial dip in the first half of 2020 (mostly in March and April), remittances appear to have rebounded to pre-COVID-19 rates and historical highs in several countries. For example, Pakistan – where remittances accounted for nearly 8 per cent of the GDP in 2019 – saw the highest amount of monthly remittances historically in July 2020 (State Bank of Pakistan, 2020). In countries such as Mexico, Egypt and Nepal, monthly remittances in the second and/or third quarters of 2020 increased to amounts higher than the previous year for the same period. Several factors could be behind this trend: Currency fluctuations paired with the effect of countries coming out of strict lockdowns – during which time usual household spending was limited and savings were higher – may have played an important role in the dip and rebound. Emerging economies faced sharp currency depreciation in February-March 2020 whereas the currencies of advanced economies were generally strong during the same period. This may have led to the usual amount of remittances sent getting converted to higher amounts in the receiving countries. The financial behaviour of migrants in times of crises could also be a factor, with migrants sending lockdown savings to support their families in countries heavily affected by the COVID-19 outbreak, but also vice versa, with families supporting migrants in countries affected. . With several major remittance sending countries facing a second wave of COVID-19 in the last quarter of 2020, this upward trend in monthly remittances may change.

Stranded Migrants and Return Migration

Due to the travel restrictions and border closures imposed by governments globally, several migrants – including seasonal workers and international students – were stranded and unable to return to their countries of origin. As of 13 July 2020, IOM’s Return Task Force had identified at least 3 million stranded migrants (IOM, 2020b). Of these, more than 1.2 million migrants were stranded in the IOM region of Middle East and North Africa (ibid.).

With migrants losing jobs and facing higher risks of being infected due to their often overcrowded living conditions, many workers are returning to their countries of origin, often with the help of bilateral negotiations that allow borders to temporarily opened to return stranded migrants. Globally, India is the country of origin of the largest number of emigrants (UN DESA, 2019) and as of 2 November 2020, India’s official repatriation operation had facilitated the return of more than 2.1 million stranded Indians from around the world (Indian Ministry of Civil Aviation, 2020). More than 600,000 undocumented Afghans returned from Iran and Pakistan between 1 March 2020 and 24 October 2020. Of these, 117,145 Afghans had returned in the first two weeks of March 2020 alone (IOM, 2020c). As of 30 October 2020, more than 136,000 Venezuelan migrants and refugees had returned to Venezuela from other countries in the region (IOM and UN OCHA, 2020). At its peak, 600 Venezuelans returned from Colombia daily and an average of 88 Venezuelans returned from Brazil daily via the border at Pacaraima (Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, 2020).  Between 1 April and 3 November 2020, IOM had assisted more than 37,600  migrants who were in quarantine facilities after returning to Ethiopia from neighbouring African countries and Saudi Arabia (IOM, 2020d).

Migration – both internal and international – drives much of the increase in urban population (IOM, 2015) (see the urbanization section below for details on international migration to urban areas). Often poor infrastructure development in the Global South has led to the exclusion of internal migrants from access to several services, including healthcare (ibid.). Data collected by IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix between 13 March and 29 October 2020 show that internal mobility restrictions in countries around the world had an impact on regular travellers and nationals in approximately 60 per cent respectively of the internal transit points assessed (2020e). With lockdowns leaving internal migrants unemployed and homeless, thousands of workers in the informal sector returned from cities such as New Delhi, India, to their hometowns (UN, 2020). 

Such exoduses of migrant workers – both international and internal migrants – have two main effects on the countries and places of origin: increased health vulnerabilities (Zenner and Wickramage, 2020) and socioeconomic pressure. In addition to the direct economic effects of lost remittances (see section above), studies show that international remittances from migrants to their families reduce child labour and keep children at school (ILO-UNICEF, 2020). With the projected loss of USD 109 billion in remittances due to COVID-19, more children are at risk of being forced into child labour. 

Conversely, return migration also affects the former countries of destination that are dependent on migrant workers in essential sectors (see section on labour migration). Migrants make up an estimated 17, 16, 15 and 14 per cent of the population in Belgium, Germany, the United States of America and the United Kingdom respectively (all among the top 20 countries with the highest number of COVID-19 cumulative cases, as of 3 November 2020), where they are also overrepresented in essential sectors such as healthcare and services. The impact of the return of migrants from these countries will be felt on both the countries of destination and origin.

Family migration

According to data by the OECD (2020) on permanent inflows of family migrants over the course of 2018, the US, France, Spain, the UK, Mexico, Italy, Germany and Belgium hosted nearly 1.3 million family migrants. The US alone hosted more than half of family migrants in these 8 OECD countries. Those family members of migrants may need special attention to cope with stress and anxiety linked to COVID-19, as well as reaching them in languages other than the official language of the country. Additionally, irregular migrants and their families may hesitate to access healthcare services due to fear of deportation or family separation.

International students

Globally, there were over 5.3 million international students in tertiary education in 2017, and 3.3 million of them were studying in Northern America and Europe (UNESCO, 2020). China, India, Germany, the Republic of Korea and Viet Nam were the top five countries of origin for international students. Nearly one in four international students came from just three countries: China, India and Germany. International students have also been affected by closure of university campuses, loss of student jobs and mobility restrictions by both origin and destination countries hit by COVID-19.

Urbanization

Approximately one in five international migrants were estimated to live in just 20 cities - Beijing, Berlin, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Chicago, Hong Kong SAR, China, London, Los Angeles, Madrid, Moscow, New York, Paris, Seoul, Shanghai, Singapore, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Vienna and Washington DC (IOM, 2015). For 18 of these cities, international migrants represented around 20 per cent of the total population (ibid.). The share of foreign-born persons in the total population in some cities exceeds the global average (around 3.4% in 2015) by a large margin (IOM, 2015). Dubai had a foreign born population of close to 83 per cent, while in Brussels it is 62 per cent, in Toronto 46 per cent, New York 37 per cent, and Melbourne 35 per cent, to name a few examples (ibid.).

Income inequality and marginalization affect local patterns of COVID-19 prevalence. For instance, while positive cases have been recorded throughout New York, most confirmed cases were in areas with the lowest median incomes, despite the limited local availability of testing. This is likely due to structural factors linked to living and working conditions preventing people from applying basic prevention and mitigation measures. More than 35 per cent of the population in New York in 2018 were foreign-born and publicly available data from the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene show that migrants are overrepresented in all but 1 of the 10 areas most affected by COVID-19 in the city (in terms of positive cases per 1000 residents).

Forced migration or displacement by conflict and disasters

Refugees and internally-displaced persons are among the most vulnerable, in particular those living in camps and other overcrowded settings. The 20 countries with the highest number of confirmed COVID-19 cases as of 3 November 2020 hosted about 4 million refugees, or 1 out of 5 refugees worldwide by the end of 2019 (GMDAC analysis based on WHO, 2020 and UNHCR, 2020). Of these 20 countries, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran, France, the US, Iraq and Italy were among the top 20 refugee-hosting countries according to data by UNHCR for the end of 2019 (ibid.). Additionally, the United States of America, Peru, Germany, Brazil, South Africa, Spain and France were among the 10 countries with the highest number of pending asylum applications as of the end of 2019 (ibid.). A total of 50.8 million people were estimated to be internally displaced by the end of 2019 – 45.7 million due to conflict and 5.1 million people in the context of disasters – within their own country. 18.3 million of the 50.8 million were younger than 15 years, and 3.7 million over 60, with both groups being particularly vulnerable (IDMC, 2020).

Migrant deaths and disappearances

Despite the mobility constraints posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, migrants continue to embark on clandestine journeys, fleeing violence and poverty and seeking to improve their lives. COVID-19 responses have increased the risks and uncertainty of these journeys, pushing people into more perilous situations where humanitarian support and rescue may not be available. More than 2,500 people have lost their lives during migration in the first half of 2020, according to data from IOM’s Missing Migrants Project. Not included in this total are the thousands of deaths linked to Covid-19 cases among migrant workers and deaths related to mobility restrictions and lockdowns.

The Central Mediterranean remains the most dangerous irregular migration route worldwide - 580 people are known to have died on this route between March and October 2020. Between March and October 2020, at least 29,710 people attempted to cross by boat from North Africa to Italy and Malta, 49 per cent more than in the same period in 2019 (12,920). There is also an ongoing crisis of “invisible shipwrecks” – cases where a boat is reported missing but no survivors are found and are therefore very difficult to verify – on maritime routes to Europe, including at least 14 such cases in 2020. Policy measures in response to COVID-19, such as port closures, and fewer search and rescue operations in the Central Mediterranean affect accurate data collection.

In September and October 2020 there has been a steady increase in crossings of the Western Africa route, from the coast of Senegal, Mauritania and Morocco to Spain’s Canary Islands. At least 7,476 people arrived in the Canary Islands in these two months alone, compared with average of 491 in the previous eight months of the year – these numbers are still far below a peak in 2006, when 32,000 arrived to the islands by boat from the coast of Africa. It is nevertheless concerning, because of the trauma and risk of death that this dangerous crossing presents. Between 1 January and 31 October 2020, MMP recorded the deaths or disappearances of at least 489 people on the migration route to the Canary Islands. This is already higher than the number of fatalities recorded in all of 2019 (210). The situation is especially concerning during COVID-19 when more care is needed to prevent overcrowding and to ensure safe reception conditions, and that health protocols and responses are applied for to all without discrimination.

Meanwhile, attempted crossings (including arrivals and interceptions) into Greece from Turkey via the land border and the Eastern Mediterranean migration route decreased by 82 per cent for March to October 2020 compared with the same period in 2019. The lockdown and other mobility restrictions adopted in Turkey as well as augmented patrolling on the Greek side likely explain this reduction in attempted crossings in the Aegean Sea. Despite this stark decrease in movement on this migration route, there has been an increase in recorded deaths – at least 91 people are known to have died as of 31 October 2020 on the eastern borders of Europe with Turkey, compared with 71 in all of 2019.

Covid-19 restrictions in South-Eastern Asia have meant hundreds of Rohingya migrants attempting to leave Myanmar have become stranded at sea as States refuse to allow them to disembark due to fears of infection. While it is difficult to know the true death toll on these stranded boats, one such stranding left an estimated 70 dead in April 2020 after the boat was refused entry to any country for more than two months. Another similar situation in September 2020 left at least 30 Rohingya migrants dead. During the 2015 Bay of Bengal crisis, which saw Rohingya boats similarly stranded, IOM documented more than 500 deaths at sea.

 By age

The UN Sustainable Development Goals call for ensuring that no one is left behind, including migrants. Different age groups face varying vulnerabilities as both migrants and as part of a certain period in life. Globally, about 12 per cent of all international migrants are 65 years and older. However, in most of the 20 countries with the highest number of confirmed cases, persons aged 65 years and older represent a lower share in the international migrant stock compared to their share in the general population. India, Brazil, France, Argentina, South Africa and Ukraine are the only countries where this is an exception. In 19 of the 20 countries with the highest number of confirmed cases, between 62 per cent and 86 per cent of migrants are estimated to be of working age (between 20 and 64 years old) (GMDAC analysis based on WHO, 2020 and UN DESA, 2019). Migrants are thus more likely to be either young or of working age and are part of the response by working in critical sectors. They are also at risk of being exposed to COVID-19 by working in sectors where home-based work is not possible (see following section on labour migration for detailed analysis). 

Migrants in countries with the highest number of cumulative COVID-19 cases, as of 3 November 2020

^{Source: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2020 (as of 3 November 2020); GMDAC analysis based on UN DESA, 2019;}

By sex

Women comprised less than half, 130 million or 47.9 per cent, of the global international migrant stock at mid-year 2019 (UN DESA, 2019). However, more female migrants are migrating independently for work, education and as heads of households. Despite these advances, female migrants may still face stronger discrimination, and are more vulnerable to mistreatment compared to male migrants. In general, the pandemic has led to an increase in gender-based violence (CARE and IRC, 2020).

Nonetheless, men are also exposed to vulnerabilities in the migration processes. Therefore, gender-responsive data on migration have potential to promote greater equality and are key to avoid exacerbated repercussions for disadvantaged groups. Care work also disproportionally rests on women, including caring for those affected by COVID-19 and children in light of day-care and school closures (ibid.). As healthcare workers, female migrants may face an additional burden to their job by having to care for family members at home and at the same time potentially facing stigmatization if in contact with patients infected with COVID-19.

The larger presence of men in the international migrant stock is also reflected in the proportion of male migrant workers. In 2017, migrant workers were estimated to be 58.4 per cent male and 41.6 per cent female (ILO, 2018). At 63.5 per cent and 48.1 per cent respectively, the labour force participation rate of migrant women was higher than that of non-migrant women in 2017 (ibid.). In the current global health crisis, female migrant workers may thus be more affected by unemployment than female nationals, and can therefore experience double discrimination as both migrants and as women in their host country.

Migration Governance

Access to healthcare

An analysis of Migration Governance Indicators (MGI) assessments conducted between 2018 and 2020, pre-COVID-19 pandemic, found that countries provide migrants with varying degrees of access to government-funded health services depending on their migratory status. The analysis, which covered 51 countries, showed that a third of these countries provide the same access to health care to both citizens and migrants, regardless of their migratory status. In half of the countries surveyed, equal access to health care is contingent on migratory status. Moreover, 12 per cent of the countries provide migrants with access to some health services only, including emergency health care (IOM, 2019; and Milan and Cunnoosamy, 2020). In most cases, there are no limitations to access to private health care or insurance.

Analysis of migration-related data from the United Nations Twelfth Inquiry among Governments on Population and Development - another effort to collect data on SDG target 10.7.2 - also shows that migrants' access to health services can depend on migratory status. The Inquiry, which collected data on 111 countries between late 2018 and early 2019, found that more than three quarters (86 per cent) of governments provide essential and emergency health care to all non-nationals, regardless of their migratory status, while 8 per cent indicate that they provide such services only to those whose status is regular.

Inclusion of migrants in crisis plans

The SARS-CoV-2 virus leading to COVID-19 affects all regardless of nationality, but migrants, also due to a lack of data, are often left out in national pandemic plans. A review of pandemic influenza preparedness plans in 21 countries of the Asia Pacific region in 2016 only found 3 countries (Thailand, Papua New Guinea and the Maldives) adequately included non-citizens beyond health control measures at borders (18 out of 21 countries, Wickramage et al., 2018). Excluding migrants’ access to entitlements or access to health care in domestic legal and policy frameworks may increase transmission risks, adverse outcomes and inhibit access to early detection, treatment and negatively affect public health management (Zenner and Wickramage, 2020).

The MGI assessments showed that one in five countries have specific measures in place to assist migrants during and after crises. These measures mainly pertain to internal displacement, refugee movements and the provision of humanitarian assistance on an equal footing to nationals and migrants. Measures on maintaining or upscaling health systems during a public health crisis are not specifically mentioned. Thirteen per cent of the countries partially include these types of measures in the sense that their strategies are inclusive of all vulnerable communities (thus informally encompassing migrants). Some countries temporarily relax immigration requirements, allowing migrants whose country of origin has been affected by a crisis to remain in the destination country beyond the usual time limit. In other cases, assistance is provided de facto to all migrants irrespective of their migration status. More than half (55 per cent) of the countries do not include any specific measures to assist migrants, but several mention that assistance is given on an ad hoc basis.

Conversely, 69 per cent of the countries offer assistance to their nationals abroad in times of crisis. Most of these countries provide emergency travel documents and repatriation possibilities, but only for broadly defined “humanitarian crises”. The rest of the countries (31 per cent) offer assistance on a case-by-case basis and only where a migrant’s country of origin is represented through consular bodies. In most cases, assistance from the country of origin is limited or even not possible when there are no consulates in the receiving country. 

Migrants, including international students or migrant workers on cruise ships, risk being stranded if border control rules are changed owing to the pandemic, with those who cannot access consular assistance being more vulnerable.

Similar to the MGI assessments, the UN Inquiry found that 68 per cent of governments have specific measures to provide assistance to citizens residing abroad in countries in crisis or post-crisis situations.

Data strengths & limitations

For detailed analyses of the strengths and limitations of the highlighted data sources, please visit the thematic pages on:

• International migrant stocks and flows
• Migration and health data
• Labour migration
• Remittances 
• Family migration
• International students
• Urbanization
• Return and Migration
• Forced migration or displacement
• Environmental migration
• Migration policies and governance

For a detailed methodology on IOM’s mobility restrictions tracking, please visit https://migration.iom.int/

¹ _{The figures on new cases face inconsistencies across countries and may underreport the real extent of case data as official figures are based on tested cases only and as such capacities to test and testing itself varies by country. The same applies to recorded deaths caused by COVID-19 as different criteria for counting deaths as COVID-19 related/based or not are used in different countries. WHO uses officially reported data, see (WHO, 2020: 9 for more details), whereas Johns Hopkins University uses WHO, CDC, ECDC, NHC, DXY, 1point3acres, Worldometers.info, BNO, the COVID Tracking Project (testing and hospitalizations), state and national government health departments, and local media reports (see Gardner, 2020  for more information). For background on the differences in mortality rates see Johns Hopkins University's Mortality Analyses.}